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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Central Asian Statehood in Post-Colonial Perspective 
 
John Heathershaw 
 
The native is an oppressed person whose 
permanent dream is to become the 
persecutor. 
Franz Fanon (1963, 53) 
 
Introduction 
Post-colonialism constitutes a diverse body of thought which explicitly 
considers states as externally-dependent and internationalized yet self-
proclaimed independent and nationalizing polities. Beginning from the 1950s, 
the influential contributions of Bhabha (1994), Fanon (1952, 1963), Said 
(1978, 1994) and Spivak (1988) in many disciplines of the humanities and 
social sciences, as well as prominent and more recent works which combine 
post-colonial perspectives with penetrating empirical study in Asia and the 
Middle East (Chatterjee 1997; Goswami 2004; Scott 1990, 1998; Wedeen 
1999) all indicate that the arrival of post-colonialism in Central Asian studies 
is long over-due. Moreover, at first glance Franz Fanon’s take on the post-
colonial experience quoted above seems a reasonably valid, if polemical, 
caricature of the acquisition of national sovereignty by Central Asian 
republics. Given the evident relevance of this approach it is remarkable that it 
has taken quite so long for a post-colonial response to the transition and 
democratization literature to emerge in Central Asian studies. Only recently 
has this lacuna been overcome with significant contributions from Adams 
(2005; 2008), Dave (2007), Edgar (2006), Kandiyotti (2002; 2007) Khalid 
(2006; 2007) and Northrop (2004) amongst others.  
This chapter investigates the emergent academic debate in Central 
Asian studies on post-coloniality and post-colonialism in Central Asia. It 
argues that there are grounds for post-colonial comparisons between Central 
Asian and other post-colonial states whilst emphasizing the contextual 
particularities of experiences in the region and the limits of the post-colonialist 
lens. The first section briefly discusses the absence of post-colonial thought in 
Central Asia, making the case for greater mutual engagement between Post-
Colonial and Central Asian studies.  Secondly, the paper goes on to outline 
some of the features of post-colonial histories of Central Asia, arguing with an 
emerging consensus in the literature that the Soviet Union should be 
understood as a modernizing multinational state with a Euro-centric imperial 
aspect. This reading of Soviet statehood has certain implications for how we 
understand the independent Central Asian states today. Thirdly, the chapter 
goes on to outline some conceptual tools of post-colonial theory—including 
hybridity, subalternity, and orientalism—and consider their evident 
applicability to Central Asian states. Finally, rather than seek to clarify a 
single post-colonial statehood in Central Asia, the chapter goes on to briefly 
discuss two examples of the utilization of post-colonial thought in Central 
Asian studies. It considers how a number of scholars have engaged the gender 
 2 
dimensions of states from a post-colonial perspective before going on to 
consider the approach of Bhavna Dave to questions of nationalism, ethnicity 
and state-building in Kazakhstan.            
 
The absence of post-colonialism 
The relative lack of engagement between Post-colonial and Central Asian 
studies until recent years warrants some reflection.  Three prominent 
explanations for the absence stand out. Firstly, it is not universally accepted 
when or to what extent Central Asia was, is or will be historically post-
colonial. The incorporation of the Central Asian polities of the late-nineteenth 
century into a revolutionary state with a contiguous territory after 1917 would 
seem to be, in some eyes, the beginnings of its post-colonial transition, albeit 
one that lacked the defining moment of national independence. However, it 
was as a re-colonized part of the Soviet Union that the region was viewed 
from the West as post-colonial thought emerged in the second half of the 
twentieth century. Since 1991, other “posts” of the region have been more 
prominent, particularly those of post-socialism and post-Sovietism. This is 
especially true for those of us who draw the boundaries of our region of study, 
in research practice and linguistic skills if not conceptually, to the exclusion of 
the wider regions of historical Central Eurasia. Thus, as explored below, the 
post-coloniality of post-Soviet Central Asia is open to question.  
Secondly, there is a lack of engagement with post-colonial theory in 
Central Asia itself. Post-colonial theory, as Gilroy notes, “is built upon debates 
over the legitimacy of colonial power” (2007, 656) and thus derives a great 
deal from the experience of decolonization and national-liberation movements. 
It is in this sense that Adams describes post-colonialism as a “contextually 
situated discourse generated by the responses (both resistant and collaborative) 
of formerly colonized peoples to the institutional legacies of and ongoing 
relationship with the colonizer” (Adams 2008, 4). Yet we must add that post-
colonialism’s thought and critique, unlike post-coloniality, is not itself wedded 
to the period after the formal end to imperial power but emerges amidst 
imperial power itself (Macey 2000, 304). That contextually situated critiques 
were still-born or co-opted in the late Tsarist period (if one considers Jadidism 
in these terms) and little more than nascent during perestroika explains the 
relative lack of post-colonial thought in post-Soviet Central Asia.  
This relative absence of post-colonial politics is paralleled by a lack of 
post-colonial writing in the region.  A body of thought largely developed by 
academics from other post-colonial regions (most prominently India) is 
perhaps of dubious worth in a region where established scholars of the 
Academies of Science have been unable or unwilling to engage with such 
theory. By contrast, these scholars often combine slightly revised versions of 
concepts derived from Soviet academe with polemical ethno-nationalisms 
which occasionally lambast the former imperial power (for example, Masov 
1991; see discussion of his later work in Laurelle 2008). Equally, whilst some 
post-Soviet political analysts, such as the Tajikistani Ibrohim Usmonov, have 
sought to derive national-patriarchal theories of the state from pre-Soviet Jadid 
scholars in order to implicitly critique today’s regimes, they have often done 
so in terms rooted in the Soviet era (Usmonov 2005; see discussion in 
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Heathershaw 2009, 68-69). As Dave notes, “state-authorized academic 
analysis and history texts are embedded in Soviet categories and thus remain 
fully ‘derivative’ in Partha Chatterjee’s terms” (2007, 23; see also Chatterjee 
1997). Such scholars are not so much agents of post-colonialist thought as the 
very disaffected subjects of the post-colonial experience anticipated in such 
thought. Indeed it is the very lack of post-colonial theorizing in the Central 
Asian context which may indicate both the region’s particular and acute post-
coloniality as well as the relevance of post-colonialist categories such as 
“subaltern” and “hybridity” to the region (see also Moore 2001, 117-118). The 
significance of the presence of such derivative academic discourses in the 
region will be discussed further below. 
Thirdly, and at least as importantly, is the failure of post-colonial 
studies itself to engage with the former Soviet Union. This is a major anomaly 
for a field which defines itself in terms of its “vast spatial unity” and is 
prepared to recognize the multiple and overlapping colonialisms else where 
(Macey 2000, 304-305). For example, in North America, Anglophone 
European settlers, Native Americans, and contemporary Francophone 
populations all have been claimed as post-colonial peoples. It is this particular 
lacuna that was finally addressed by David Chioni Moore’s (2001) question: 
“Is the Post- in Postcolonial the Post- in Post-Soviet?”  Moore’s answer is 
very much in the affirmative, noting first, “how extraordinarily postcolonial 
the societies of the former Soviet Union are, and, second, how extraordinarily 
little attention is paid to this fact” (2001, 114). One explanation for post-
colonialism’s silence is found in the spatial imaginaries of the Cold War 
period where the categorization of First, Second and Third worlds became 
popular with the communist Second World deemed by some on the political 
Left as providing the alternative model to the domination of the First World 
and the underdevelopment (at the hands of the First World) of the Third 
(Moore 2001, 117). A second reason posited is the idea of adjacence—the 
contiguous Russian empire was not or, at least, was less imperial because of 
its common Asianess or Eurasianess with its conquered territories. Moore 
finds this interpretation in Said’s Culture and Imperialism where this 
adjacence is seen as somehow diluting Russia’s imperialism vis-à-vis that of 
Britain and France (Moore 2001, 119; Said 1993, 10).     
None of these three explanations provide an adequate reason not to 
investigate the Central Asian states in the post-colonial context as has been 
increasingly acknowledged by scholars in the field. Thus, Dave’s (2007) 
excellent work is germinal in drawing on post-colonial thought to produce a 
research monograph in contemporary Central Asian studies. More common 
has been the way in which some Central Asianists have drawn implicitly on 
post-colonialist thinking or adopted corollary categories of thought. Concepts 
of hybridity and notions of sub-alterneity have, appropriately, made their way 
into Central Asian Studies by the back door in terms such as “strong-weak 
states” (McMann 2004) and “inbetweeness” (Bhaba 1994; Heathershaw 2009, 
103-109).  Others, considering these inconsistencies in normative terms, make 
post-colonial comparison between Central Asian and African states and see 
cause for alarm in the extent and implications of “a crisis of the state in its 
most fundamental sense” witnessed most acutely in the civil wars affecting 
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Tajikistan, Georgia, and Moldova (Beissinger and Young 2002, 466). The 
post-colonial state is characterized by such inconsistencies and post-colonial 
analysis is replete with such conceptualizations.  Yet, these apparent 
contradictions are better seen not as conceptual barriers to be overcome via a 
quantitative measurement of the degree of strength and weakness but as 
dynamics which are entirely consistent with the ambivalences of the post-
colonial state. Thus state crisis may not be killed of by what Beissinger and 
Young call “the imperative of stabilization” (2002, 480), but this crisis may 
give birth to the very stability in that it constitutes the reformation of Soviet-
era political culture and hybrid institutions. It is this quite derivative process, I 
would argue, which has characterized Tajikistan’s post-conflict and post-
colonial “peacebuilding” (Heathershaw 2009). As such, evidence is 
accumulating that a more historical, comparative and theoretically enriched 
understanding of the post-colonial state is long overdue in Central Asian 
studies.      
 
 
Anti-colonial and post-Colonial Central Asia 
To think of Central Asian states as post-colonial is to premise one’s analysis 
on a disputed statement of fact. Emphasizing Central Asia’s post-coloniality is 
to say more than that at many times the region has been subject to empire, and 
may still be subject to it in generations to come (see Laura Adams’ (2008, 4-6) 
interesting discussion of the question of “When is postcolonialism?”). Rather 
it posits further descriptive and explanatory claims about the when and the 
how of post-Soviet Central Asia.  
Firstly, the descriptive claim is that post-colonial Central Asian states 
were part of a Soviet empire until the declarations of independence in late-
August and early-September 1991.
1 
Central Asia’s coloniality went largely 
unquestioned in the Western academy until the post-Soviet era. For many 
analysts it was received wisdom that the USSR was an empire which in the 
South took the form of a European power dominating an Asiatic, Muslim 
subject people (see Myer 2002). This perception continued into the early-
1990s as leading analysts interpreted the transition through Soviet rule in 
terms of the descriptors “pre-colonial” and “post-colonial” (Akiner 1993). 
Others have found cause to use the post-colonial label not as an “objective 
criteria” but as social constructs. Some commentators explain that: 
 
In the post-colonial context, what therefore becomes important is how the borderland 
states and their peoples envisage the Soviet experience within such discursive worlds 
in which meaningful action takes place on the basis of perceptions, values and 
culturally formed expectations. Thus the borderland post-Soviet states can be 
considered as post-colonial in the sense that they are constructed and labeled as such 
by their nation-builders. (Smith et al. 1997, 8)      
 
                                                 
1
 For a discussion of this debate in the Central Asian context see Khalid (2006, 2007); for 
arguments for the Soviet Union as postcolonial or decolonizing polity in Central Asia see 
Pianciola and Sartori (2007) and Teichman (2007); for arguments for Soviet Central Asia as 
colonial see Northrop (2004); Beissigner (2008) gives a nice summary of the recent shifts in 
this debate across the wider region. 
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Some contemporary historians of the region have reasserted the coloniality of 
Soviet Central Asia. This is most notable perhaps in the work of Douglas 
Northrop who in Veiled Empire (2004) charts conflicts over the early-Soviet 
unveiling of women known as the hujum as a campaign of colonial 
government versus anti-colonial resistance.  
However, the equation of post-Soviet and post-colonial in either 
objectivist or social constructivist terms is contentious for a number of 
reasons, not least because the Soviet Union claimed itself to be postcolonial. 
Policies of korenizatsiya were explicitly aimed at instituting a multi-national, 
post-imperial modernizing state in generating competing dynamics of 
differentiated provisions for natives and homogenization of all peoples under a 
single, unified system. Khalid has argued that, in particular, early Soviet 
Central Asia cannot be regarded as colonial but rather the degree of micro-
management it practiced makes it more akin to a “modern mobilizational 
state” which “aimed at the conquest of difference” (2006, 232-223, 238). 
Moreover, “the state actively intervened in society and created new cadres that 
helped carry out its work” (Khalid 2006, 250). As such, comparisons between 
the USSR and modernizing states such as Kemalist Turkey, Iran before the 
revolution and Afghanistan before its wars are instructive (Khalid 2006; Edgar 
2006). That these states used a great deal of physical violence on their subject 
peoples does not necessarily indicate imperialism. Khalid concludes that, 
 
Both the Soviet and the Kemalist states had at their disposal the baggage, common 
to modern European thought, of evolution, of backwardness and progress, of 
ethnic classification of peoples, and, indeed, of orientalism. But it matters a great 
deal whether the baggage is deployed to exclude people from politics or to force 
their entry into it, whether it is used to assert inequalities or to preach world 
revolution. (Khalid 2006, 251) 
    
Such criticism of the application of post-colonialism to Central Asia 
refocuses our mind on the Soviet state as a centre of domination for 
modernization as well as, perhaps, colonization. Indeed, a number of scholars 
have pointed out that it is not necessary to conceptualize and analyze the 
Soviet Union as either an empire or a modernizing state but that it contained 
elements of both forms in its particular polity. The notions of “affirmative 
action empire” (Martin), “empire of nations” (Hirsch) and “empire-state” 
(Beissinger) capture this ambiguity. Beissinger (2006) argues that we can label 
the Soviet Union as an empire in that it bears a Wittgensteinian “family 
resemblance” to other empires. This is not simply that in certain times (1920s 
and 1930s) and places (especially the Baltic states) of the Union was Soviet 
power considered imperial, but also that the formation of nationalities was at 
least partially an imperial imposition. Beissinger notes: “for the concept of 
empire to have any analytical utility in the Soviet context, we need to properly 
situate the ‘national’ within the ‘imperial’, to rescue empire from nation” 
(Beissinger 2006, 298).  
The dual role of empire and nation-state is perhaps most clearly shown 
in its contradictory role in the creation of national identities and in establishing 
an institutional basis for its own dismemberment in 1991. “Empires,” 
Adrianne Edgar summarizes, “tend to promote and consolidate differences, 
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while nation-states seek to foster homogeneity and cohesiveness; the Soviet 
state, which created separate ethnoterritorial republics within a centralized 
socialist polity did both” (Edgar 2006, 255). It is in this sense that, in 
Verdery’s claim, “the Soviet empire was more self-consciously invasive and 
ambitious than West European empires” (Verdery 2001, 16). In this 
inconsistent state subjective factors become particularly important and the 
perception of the foreignness of the Soviet empire, despite its explicit 
campaign to break this down, remained and perhaps grew stronger. Thus, 
Edgar argues, similarities between Central Asia and colonized places are made 
manifest “in the response to Soviet policies, not in the policies themselves” 
(Edgar 2006, 272).  
This leads to the second, explanatory claim that the end of that Soviet 
empire in Central Asia was brought about by a post-colonial dialectic where 
“the contradictions inherent in colonialism produced conditions that allowed 
for the eventual destruction of colonialism” (Adams 2008, 2; see also Bhabha 
1994). This contradiction was the propagation of a discourse of emancipation 
under a structure of domination. The point here is that, leaving aside the 
difficult historical question of quite how domineering the centre was, in that 
the USSR ought to be considered both empire and modernizing state we are 
faced with a  parallel dynamic, if not dialectic, that it is the forces unleashed 
by modernization that brought the Soviet state-empire to its knees. As Edgar 
claims, “the active Soviet promotion of linguistic and territorial nations in 
Central Asia heightened the perception of Moscow’s rule as ‘foreign’” (Edgar 
2006, 256). Yet in the Central Asian region in particular we are led to question 
the validity of the post-colonial dialectic. Voluminous scholarship on this 
question has shown that in the fall of the Soviet Union there are other political 
factors worthy of consideration, from intra-elite competition to international 
relations, in addition to nationalist mobilization. Moreover, as Beissinger has 
shown this nationalist mobilization was often “diffuse, local and religious in 
character” (ref), rather than anti-colonial nationalist, in its various centers of 
activity before and during the tumultuous events of 1991. By this time the 
Soviet Union may have been perceived less as imperial and more as 
incomplete. As Adams plainly asserts, “the perception of Moscow as an 
‘alien’ power no doubt decreased over time” (2008, 4).  
Some significant caveats must thus be placed on the description of 
Soviet Central Asia as colonial. Yet rather than seek to square this circle it 
may be better, once again, to accept that the Soviet Union was more or less 
foreign or domestic over different spaces, times and media. This might help 
explain the ambivalence in the region with regard to the “struggle” for 
independence and contemporary elites projects of “nation-building”. In post-
colonial places with strong decolonization movements, such as India or 
perhaps Latvia, the othering of the imperial centre was perhaps less tempered 
by a sense of Soviet identity. Accordingly, policies strategies which have 
emerged in these places since 1991 can properly be considered anti-colonial. 
In Central Asia by contrast, the nationalist movements which emerged in the 
republics such as Rastokhez in Tajikistan and Birlik in Uzbekistan were barely 
established once independence came and had little impact after this time. 
Moreover it is doubtful whether they ever acquired any popular purchase 
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beyond fleeting moments of popular protest, being dominated as they were by 
intellectual and cultural elites as well as students. 
However, if one casts the net wider it is apparent that anti-colonial 
sentiment was very much part of the late-Soviet period and its popular salience 
may have been greater than appears at first sight. Novels such as renowned 
Kyrgyz author Chingiz Aitmatov’s I dol’she veka dlit’sia den  (The Day Lasts 
More than a Hundred Years, 1980) are explicitly post-colonial with its 
conception of “mankurt” who loses his memory and kills his own mother 
having forgotten who she really was. That this novel and other Soviet-era texts 
have been drawn into political discourse by post-Soviet elites ought to 
highlight the significance of post-colonial threads of discourse. Karagulova 
and Megoran (2006) show, for example, how in its dying days the government 
of Askar Akaev mobilized the idea of mankurt to speak against foreign 
domination, this time by Western agencies who had increasingly become 
disaffected with the Kyrgyzstani government. Although this strategy may have 
not prevented the slow seepage of the Akaev government’s legitimacy—one 
contributing factor in its downfall of March 2005—the broader point that this 
post-colonial current remains in the post-Soviet era is worthy of further 
attention.  
Similar trends are discussed by Adams in her account of how post-
Soviet Uzbek theatre inverts the image of the Russian “elder brother” in 
positing the superiority of Uzbek culture over Russian in new anti-colonial 
plays showing in state and independent theatres whilst still conveying this 
polemic through a theatrical medium which was introduced to the region 
during the Russian colonial period and used as a device for modernization in 
the Soviet era (Adams 2005). Political researchers would do well to consider 
how anti-colonial texts conceived the Soviet state and how such sentiments 
imagine the power of the state today, at once resisting and co-opting the 
colonial legacy. Aitmatov’s mixture of the surreal, as evinced by his 
moonscapes, and totalitarian—“that the Soviet state wanted Central Asians to 
forget who they were in order to subjugate them” (Adams 2008, 4)—provides 
a model of a statist imaginary where the centre of power is both 
dispassionately distant and fantastically almighty. Subordinate discourses of 
contemporary Central Asian apparently invoke similar themes (Heathershaw 
2009, 72-79), although post-colonial theorists caution us against essentializing 
their character (Spivak 1988).    
Anti-colonial and post-colonial discourses can also be found in more 
familiar territory if one looks hard enough. In Tajikistan, a clearer strain of 
anti-colonialism can be found amongst activists of the Islamic Revival Party 
(IRP) which was born in anti-Soviet struggle but remains a diminished but 
influential movement today. The demands of IRP’s activists from its founding 
in the late-1980s for greater freedom of religion should not be seen as an 
acceptance of the public-private space dichotomy presupposed by the 
European secular state model. Rather these demands were and continue to be 
articulated by some in the party against a strict notion of the secular state 
pushed by governmental officials and members of Tajikistan’s secularist elite. 
Muhammadshariff Himatzoda, one of two parliamentary deputies in the party, 
describes the party’s members as “Muslim-citizens” of Tajikistan 
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(Himmatzoda 2003a), a term used to imply that confessional and national 
identities go hand-in-hand. Himmatzoda presses for an increased role of Islam 
in politics and questions the separation of church and state as a Western idea 
inappropriate for Islamic societies. He openly objects to those who interpret 
Article 8 of the constitution as excluding all expressions of religion from the 
secular state (2003a). The party’s other parliamentary deputy and its official 
leader Muhiddin Kabiri, however, tends to avoid these questions which remain 
unacceptable to both national and international elites. His writings and public 
comments have particularly accentuated the differences between the IRP and 
radical groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (Kabiri 2003a), and emphasized 
cooperation with international organizations (Kabiri 2003b). His is arguably a 
derivative discourse articulated strategically to curry favour amongst foreign 
diplomats and donors and is pitted against the derivative discourses of 
statehood found amongst the Tajikistani elite (Heathershaw 2009, 105-106).  
         
Post-colonialist perspectives on Central Asian states 
The above discussion has highlighted sufficient empirical evidence for the 
post-coloniality of the Central Asian states. The subsequent question arises as 
to how statehood is approached from a post-colonialist perspective. Shedding 
greater light on the extent to which both anti- and post-colonial discourses 
extend beyond the cultural realm to the formal and informal political 
opposition of Central Asian states (that is the political parties and politicized 
“civil society organizations”) requires more than the selection of illustrations. 
Some kind of comparative dimension with post-colonial states in Africa or 
elsewhere in Asia is surely important. In addition to inquiry with regard to the 
position of religion and ethno-linguistic identity at least two other dimensions 
of the post-colonial experience might be raised: gender and family relations 
and, secondly, political economy. Both of these dimensions bring the 
opportunity to more closely “weave together the culturalist and materialist 
strands of theorizing about postcolonialism in Central Eurasia” (Adams 2008, 
6). Fortunately, thirty years of work in other regions provides us with a 
number of well-developed concepts which can be considered in the context of 
the Central Asian state. These are hybridity (along with its related notions of 
inbetweeness and derivative discourses), subalterneity and orientalism.  
Hybrid state institutions and governmental practices are central to the 
study of the Central Asian state. Hybridity refers to new transcultural forms 
which emerge out of the colonial experience where new (often nationalist) 
goals are sought according to categories and criteria which are rooted in the 
colonial era. Whilst for Bhaba (1994) hybridity or “inbetween spaces” can 
allow for release from the strictures of inclusion/exclusion and public and 
hidden transcripts, in Central Asian studies hybridity has often been seen in 
quite conservative or normalizing terms by scholars who have implicitly or 
partially drawn on post-colonial work. Morgan Liu’s notion of the 
postsocialist political imagination in 1990s Uzbekistan which “envisioned 
eventual economic and political liberalization within solidly Soviet 
assumptions about the role of the state” (2002, 192) is comparable to hybrid or 
“derivative” discourse. Equally, my own work on the inbetweeness of both 
international- and state-supported new political parties in post-conflict 
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Tajikistan indicates that they are bound by strictures of dependency either on 
international donors or national regimes (Heathershaw 2009b, forthcoming).  
These two brief examples lead to two points of interest for us. Firstly, 
there is a need perhaps to engage more deliberately and explicitly with post-
colonial thought in order to see the full range of positive and negative, direct 
and indirect effects of hybridity on the “strong-weak” Central Asian state 
(McMann 2004). Secondly, both examples indicate the complexity of the post-
colonial experience in Central Asia where at least two extant “metropoles” can 
be imagined: the Soviet centre of Moscow and the capitalist metropolitan 
networks where power circulates around the donor capitals of New York, 
Washington, Berlin, Geneva, London, etc. International development 
assistance to build both political and civil society has a distinctly post-colonial 
character as it seeks to establish a new “standard of civilization” for the so-
called “quasi-states” which emerged from the ends of European empires 
(Jackson 1990). Liu argues that “attempts to encourage ‘grassrooots’ 
initiatives may end up reinforcing such illiberal institutions as patriarchy and 
clientelism” (Liu 2003, 3-4).  
My own research in Tajikistan (Heathershaw 2009a, ch.7) found that 
the hybrid community-based organizations incorporated both local 
government figures and formally non-governmental village elders in setting 
goals commensurable to the post-socialist political imagination described 
above. Often unbeknown to the international staff of NGOs, these individuals 
were typically networked either by blood, association or economic relations of 
patronage as pre-existing institutions were reformed and emboldened by 
international assistance. However, there was some evidence that in certain 
villages, such as the border settlement of Kizil Ketmen, these hybrid 
institutions, drawing as they did on multiple sources of capital and authority 
(donor, state, migrant) were able to institute more responsive forms of state-
societal interaction (Heathershaw 2005). Whilst governance remained 
patriarchal in this setting it was undoubtedly more benign, more flexible and 
better resourced.   This seemed to be shown by the hybrid international-local 
group’s success of getting state officials linked to cotton farmers and 
financiers to agree to the redirection of an irrigation ditch away from the 
cotton fields to support village garden plots. The post-colonial hybridity is 
apparent here in the necessity to maintain multiple and contrasting 
representations of the villages to multiple audiences with neo-liberal and post-
socialist (in the sense described above) agendas.        
A second post-colonial concept of relevance is that of the subaltern. 
The essential position of the subaltern, nor how the category differs from that 
of subordinate, is not entirely clear. However, a burgeoning literature of 
Subaltern Studies has been established to explore both subaltern responses and 
autonomous tactics of scratching out a living in the post-colonial state. This 
may seem irrelevant to orthodox political scientists studying the state yet, from 
the perspective of post-colonialism, it is on the margins of the state that it is 
constructed and transformed. Subalterneity gets beyond the realm of the 
“hidden transcript” to explore the sites at which that alternative world breaks 
through and shapes public life (Scott 1990). This is perhaps particularly 
important in our reading of the history of the formation of republican 
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boundaries in the delimitation of borders in Soviet Central Asia. Recent 
research indicates that the responses and politically-driven compromises of 
native elites played an extremely important role in determining the ultimate 
delimitation of 1924 (Beissinger 2006). Moreover, Dave regards local 
communist elites as subaltern in that they “occupied a strategic position as 
intermediaries between the centre and their ethno-national constituencies, 
which allowed them to exert control over local distribution channels and serve 
as ‘purveyors of patronage’” (Dave 2007, 95). It was perhaps the subaltenity, 
in this sense, of their positions which allowed many elites in the Central Asian 
republics to retain their positions after independence. 
Finally, the work of the Palestinian literary critic Edward Said 
introduces the concept of orientalism, defined as the “systematic discipline by 
which European culture was able to manage—and even produced—the Orient 
politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and 
imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period” (Said 1978, 3). In his 
book Orientalism (1978), Said sought to expose the power relations in 
knowledge production about and for the Middle East. The term refers to 
certain assumptions made about the Eastern “other” and, more importantly, to 
the processes of reduction, characterization and auto-surveillance which 
accompany orientalist inquiry. Whilst the extent to which Central Asia is seen 
through orientalist eyes is at least questionable, given its inclusion via Euro-
centric spatial imaginaries into the post-socialist and post-Soviet worlds, there 
is no doubt that reductive moves and auto-surveillance are as much a part of 
Central Asian studies as they are any other field of academic study. Moreover, 
conceptions of the Central Asian states and socieities propagated by Western 
and Soviet specialists of the region both during and after the Soviet period 
have been marked by orientalist assumptions of, for example, the role of Islam 
or the nature of inter-ethnic relations (Myer 2003). Indeed one recent paper 
specifically challenges political and geopolitical analysis of Central Asia for 
its use of reductive categories of analysis and adoption of a geopolitical gaze 
which emphasizes the region’s Asiatic identity (over local self-perceptions of 
being European or Eurasian), its obscurity and fractiousness (Heathershaw and 
Megoran 2008). 
 
Rethinking the post-Soviet state through post-colonialism 
Via these concepts, post-colonial thought provides a critique of dominant 
political science approaches and an explanation for the resistance it faces as a 
theoretical perspective from within the region. It offers more than simply anti-
Orientalist deconstruction of prevailing “Western” approaches. Its conceptual 
tools provide a framework for thinking through statehood in its dynamics of 
continuity and change from the Soviet era. In doing so post-colonial thinkers 
highlight some familiar themes (e.g. nationalism) as well as some which are 
often over-looked in mainstream political science analysis (e.g. gender). As 
examples of the relevance of post-colonialism, this final section considers 
Bhavna Dave’s groundbreaking use of it in her study of Kazakh politics before 
going on to consider the gender dimensions of the post-colonial state in 
Central Asia.  
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Bhavna Dave’s Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language, and Power directly 
engages and refines post-colonial thought on the state in the Central Asian 
context. Dave, a UK-based Central Asianist of Indian origin, cognizant of the 
Subaltern Studies literature, is particularly well-placed to make this 
transposition and it seems that her identity facilitated certain insights. She 
records a personal encounter with one Kazakh nationalist academic who 
emphasized his post-colonial solidarity with her whilst couching this in terms 
sympathetic to the imperial quest. He expressed, “not a disapproval of colonial 
domination per se, but a feeling of disappointment by the failure of the Soviet 
state to deliver its promised goals” (Dave 2007, 2). Equally, she notes how 
comparison to African and Asian cases is “seen by elites and ordinary people 
as an affront, given the extent to which they have embraced and internalized 
the linear logic of Soviet developmental categories, ethno-racial stereotypes 
and obsession with becoming ‘civilized’” (Dave 2007, 12). This is the 
ambivalence with which Central Asians confront their post-coloniality. It 
indicates how a post-colonial approach can both shed light on the subject 
matter of the Central Asian states (their derivative discourses, institutional 
hybridity and tactics to accommodate subalterns) whilst also accounting for 
the hostility of that state’s subjects to this very way of thinking.  
The merging of modernization, nationality, and post-coloniality is the 
primary aspect of post-Soviet Kazakhstan which she describes as “the most 
sovietized, that is, ‘internationalist’ of all Muslim nations” (Dave 2007, 2). 
Yet, at the same time her work highlights the differences between historical 
post-coloniality and theoretical post-colonialism in that, “the depiction of 
Soviet rule in Kazakhstan and Central Asia as predominantly colonial or 
imperial, and the portrayal of Central Asians as powerless subjects and 
recipients of Soviet modernity are both simplistic and inaccurate” (Dave 2007, 
5). Rather her focus is on how statespersons have manipulated Soviet-style 
discourse and nationalist tropes. At the same time, the state of Kazakhstan is 
very much a product of adaptation of the hybrid institutions formed in the 
Soviet era when “the pervasiveness of patron-client networks, personal ties 
centered on kinship and regional solidarities were integral elements of a 
socialist system that displaced markets and all forms of exchange and 
competition” (Dave 2007, 25). This is the key to understanding Kazakhstan’s 
unexpected and much-vaunted stability and “ethnic harmony” (Dave 2007, 
139) as well as its exacerbation of patrimonialism (Dave 2007, 157) which 
might otherwise lead to instability due to the exclusion of certain groups. 
Whilst formally and increasingly “Kazakhified,” in practice the state is 
inclusive in its patron-client networks across ethnic groups.      
Whilst these research findings might be comparable to many other 
analyses of post-socialism, in drawing on post-colonial theory Dave’s work 
becomes innovative. It is of interest here in that it provides the basis for an 
advance on orthodox political science approaches to the state. The book is 
situated in critiques not just of the sovietological approach but of both the 
once fashionable transition approach and its presently fashionable neo-
institutionalist critique. Both of these approaches she sees as being neglectful 
of “the role of culture, historical framework and cognitive frames” (Dave 
2007, 11) often in favour of rational choice individualism. She explicitly 
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criticizes Gryzmala-Busse and Jones-Luong’s neo-institutionalism for its strict 
formal versus informal dichotomy where states and regimes are decoupled. By 
contrast she argues that state formation “has proceeded alongside the 
consolidation of the Soviet-erected regimes” (Dave 2007, 11). In that Central 
Asian elites subverted and accommodated Soviet institutions so too we see 
this adaptation for a form of regime-/state-building in the post-Soviet era. 
“What we are witnessing”, she argues, “is not a mere dismantling or erosion of 
Soviet-era practices, institutions and mindsets but rather their ongoing 
adaptation and reconfiguration in a changed context” (Dave 2007, 28).  
Dave’s work is the nearest we have in Central Asian studies to a 
guidebook on how to apply post-colonialism to the study of the state in the 
region. Its first chapter in particular comes highly recommended. Here she 
identifies “four crucial insights of postcolonial and subaltern theory which 
help us to explore the effects of Soviet cognitive and institutionalizing frames 
on the post-Soviet nationalizing state” (Dave 2007, 23). Firstly, and simply, 
Dave argues for the importance of the colonial legacy which “introduced a 
new ontology of nation and statehood to apprehend the modern world” (2007, 
23). Second, post-colonial comparison shows us that the formal acquisition of 
national sovereignty is only a “starting point” to create a “national 
imagination” where subaltern discourses offer fresh perspectives departing 
from derivative narratives (Dave 2007, 24). Third, we must study “the 
collaboration of native elites with the colonial order” (2007, 24) so as to 
discern how these categories are re-applied in the post-Soviet state. Finally, 
we must separate the elite and subaltern or popular domains to provide a less 
elitist approach to state formation which takes account of how the colonial and 
post-colonial Central Asian states were formed in their encounters on the 
margins with subalterns and non-titular national groups.            
Dave’s Kazakhstan is thus an excellent contribution to the field which 
deserves to be a germinal, even foundational, text for the study of post-
colonial Central Asian statehood. It is, however, not without its oversights and 
one wonders what post-colonialist scholars who draw on post-modern 
epistemologies would think of the opposition posited between “symbolic” and 
“real” power (Dave 2007, 26). This risks recasting the dualist thinking  
characterizes the neo-instiutionalist distinction between formal and informal 
cited above. In fact the symbolic and material dimensions of power are surely 
intersubjective and co-constitutive in the Foucauldian sense (see Lukes 2003). 
Arguably this is clearly shown in Soviet nationalities policy. As Dave herself 
notes, “the ideological and symbolic recognition granted to the titular 
communist elites as representatives of their ethnic community allowed them to 
presume the consent of their ethnic constituencies and thus claim ‘legitimacy’” 
(Dave 2007, 27). This power is surely no less real in that it enabled them to 
extract resources and further consolidate their power. A thoroughly post-
colonial analysis examines hybridity and subalterneity in both their co-
constituted symbolic and material dimensions.  
By contrast, post-colonial thinkers have most often been criticized for 
their failure to engage in questions of economic relations and for privileging 
instead cultural questions of identity and subjectivity (Macey 2000). This may 
be partly explained by the roots of post-colonialism in literary studies. In the 
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Central Asian context this misstep has thankfully not been made. One very 
good example of how economic questions have been brought to the fore might 
be in the area of gender, particularly in the work of Deniz Kandiyotti, Dave’s 
colleague at the School of Oriental and African Studies. The position of 
women acutely raises the inconsistency of Central Asia’s post-colonial 
condition in the context of the rapid reversal of the apparent gains in women’s 
rights claimed during the Soviet era. Whilst women’s rights in the Soviet era 
provided a means “to substitute state control for patriarchal control of women” 
this is as much the work of a modernizing state as it is that of an empire 
(Edgar 2006, 263). Equally then the retreat of state control against a re-
emergence of patriarchal control in the post-Soviet era is at least as much 
about relative demodernization as decolonization, especially in that has been 
disproportionately advanced in rural areas. Kandiyotti (2007) is thus led to 
challenge the portrayal of gender relations via postcolonialism (Northrop 
2004) in positing what she calls the “Soviet paradox”, which  
 
resides in the combined and contradictory operations of a socialist paternalism 
that supported and legitimized women’s presence in the public sphere (through 
education, work and political representation), with a command economy and 
nationalities policy that effectively stalled processes of transformation 
commonly associated with modernity. (Kandiyotti 2007, 602) 
 
Thus, for Kandiyotti, there remains a deep ambivalence in the post-
Soviet legacy as the state retreated from the provision of public goods. To 
categorize the aftermath of this shock as a return to “tradition” forsakes a 
number of attributes of the Soviet experience including that many so-called 
traditions were harnessed and adapted by the modernizing state as acceptable 
and harmless expressions of local culture. However, the way that traditional 
forms of social organization were reconstituted into the Soviet state 
unintentionally created the “localism” (mestnichestvo) which has characterized 
its breakdown (Humphreys 1998; Roy 2000). This process, Kandiyotti notes, 
cannot simply be interpreted as either anti-colonial resistance or the failure of 
modernization (2007, 616). Nevertheless, these new forms of state-societal 
arrangements for patriarchal control allow us to assess post-colonialist 
concepts which might shed light on their form. There is undoubtedly a hybrid 
or derivate character to post-Soviet change taking place via forces of de-/re-
modernization of social infrastructure (through international aid) and de-
territorialization and re-spatialisation of livelihoods (through seasonal labor 
migration).  
 
Conclusions 
For post-colonialism to become established as an important body of thought 
driving research on the state in Central Asia it must show in worth in empirical 
studies. It has begun to do this in the studies of nationalism and gender as well 
as in some excellent historical studies (Edgar 2004; Khalid 2006). There is 
clearly much scope for further combination of post-socialism and post-
colonialism particularly in terms of the mutation and adaptation of Soviet-era 
economic relationships, networks and practices. Gas stands out as the obvious 
commodity worthy of study in this regard as the privileged position of (now 
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Russian national) state utilities has largely been maintained. Cotton has 
similarly been subject to post-colonial continuities and derivative practices 
with, for example, the continuance of an environmentally unsustainable mono-
culture alongside an increased reliance on forced and child labor during the 
main harvest season. However, this system has been brought to crisis by 
exposure to international finance and the accumulation of debt on the global 
capital markets which has exposed the inadequacies of the system of futures 
companies across the key growing regions. It is surely the structural violence 
of the global market that characterizes (post-colonial) Central Asian 
economies as much as it is their hybridity, a characteristic which serves to 
exacerbate their economic vulnerability. In this sense the post-colonial 
condition is the context for “struggles over resources, legitimacy, and 
meaning” (Kandiyotti 2002, 295).   
There is then some agreement between scholars who have recently 
adopted post-colonialism in the Central Asian context that its value and utility 
is determined by the way in which it is combined with other theoretical 
approaches, be they those of post-socialism (Verdery 2002) or analyses of 
capitalism that often take on a (post-)Marxist hue. It is in this sense that post-
colonialism remains a vital resource in our analyses of Central Asian states as 
it provides for both comparison and contrast with other theoretical 
perspectives. To be sure, there are significant differences in form and degree 
of imperialism in comparison with other regions of post-coloniality, most 
particularly the neighboring Indian sub-continent. Yet the intellectual benefits 
of making such comparisons are more far-reaching as they suggest a 
contribution that Central Asia can make to the wider study of the post-colonial 
world. “We can no longer rejoice,” Khalid notes, “in any kind of certainty 
over what a ‘real’ colonial empire ought to look like” (2007, 471).   
It can be concluded then that the post-coloniality of Central Asian 
states is an integral dimension of their continuance today, almost twenty years 
after the fall of the USSR. This dimension must be seen alongside gendered, 
post-modern, post-socialist, international, globalizing and other aspects yet it 
remains a vital element of any analysis of state-ideas, -persons, effects and 
affects. Whether post-colonialism as a body of theory can tell us a great deal 
about elite domination and subordinate survival strategies in contemporary 
Central Asian states is, however, more controversial. Regarding certain 
research questions, concepts such as hybridity and inbetweenness, 
subalterneity and derivative discourse certainly have descriptive and 
explanatory leverage. That is, they get at aspects of the contemporary Central 
Asian state and provide a lens through which the failure of “transition” can be 
outlined. However, one will not find in post-colonialism well-formed causal 
theories of Central Asian stateness and state weakness. Any attempt to derive 
such a theory from the diverse body of post-colonial thought would be 
fanciful.  
Perhaps the greatest contribution of a post-colonial perspective on 
Central Asian statehood is not in the concepts themselves but in the 
circumspection and vigorous critical orientation that characterizes it as a mode 
of inquiry. In that the subaltern cannot speak then perhaps we, as researchers, 
should be more cautious in attributing to him/her attitudes, opinions, personal 
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narratives and tactics. This warning is as much of relevance to the author’s 
own work (Heathershaw 2009) as it is to other scholars from anthropologists 
to political scientists who extrapolate individual narratives and public opinions 
with regard to the Central Asian state. Moreover, claims about imminent 
failure or collapse of Central Asian states are oft-repeated but repeatedly prove 
to be poor predictions of political practice (in the case of Tajikistan see the 
Dadmehr (2005), Crosston (2007), ICG (2009)). Post-colonialism encourages 
us to rethink the premises of stateness that inform this Euro-centric analysis. It 
demands that we pay attention to the diverse modes of instituting, interpreting, 
practicing and embodying the post-colonial Central Asian state.  
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